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Articles
Whites Will Be Whites:
The Failure to Interrogate
Racial Privilege
By JOHN A. POWELL*
THE PROJECT OF naming and seeing the Whiteness of Whiteness
and then decentering Whiteness from its position as the universal
norm is an important and significant project. One of the most elo-
quent voices in this project is Professor Stephanie Wildman's. In her
work on privilege, Professor Wildman interrogates and exposes what is
often viewed as an objective norm as hiding within the language of the
dominant discourse. Professor Wildman states that once we learn to
look for this privilege and how to look for it, we start to discover it in
virtually all aspects of our life. But Professor Wildman's project is not
simply to name privilege but to destabilize and change it.1 I would
like to associate myself with this project. In doing so, I want to ex-
amine some of the complexities and difficulties with the project. I
should be clear, however, that I am not pointing out the difficulties to
derail the project, but to sharpen and deepen the effort.
I will not spend much time arguing that there is indeed White
privilege in our society. I have argued this in other articles and Profes-
sor Wildman, Professor Grillo, Professor Crenshaw, Professor McIn-
tosh, Professor Frankenberg, Professor Roediger, Professor Calmore,
* Marvin J. Sonosky Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of Minnesota Law
School; Executive Director, Institute on Race and Poverty. I appreciate the research
assistance of Mark Girouard and Colleen Walbran.
1. See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996). See also Ruth Frankenberg, Whiteness and Americanness: Exam-
ining Constructions of Race, Culture, and Nation in White Women's Life Narratives, in RACE 62
(Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994).
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Professor Delgado, and many others have effectively argued this
point.2
Instead, I accept that there is White racial privilege-of what
Peggy McIntosh calls the negative kind, 3 and what I prefer to call
White supremacy or White racial hierarchy-and I endeavor to deter-
mine how we should think about it. Without trying to comprehen-
sively address any one of these important issues, this Article will focus
on several concerns. The first is the relationship between privilege
and Otherness, rhetorically. Next, I review the nature and function of
privilege as it has been articulated. Part of this review is an examina-
tion of the ways in which the rhetoric of privilege contributes to its
invisibility, and corroborates the myth of White innocence. I touch on
the problems that confronting privilege creates for Whites, and then
move to a far more involved critique of privilege.
In order to more fully state the problem and make the case for a
transformative approach to racial privilege, I here engage the debate
of sameness and difference, or Whiteness and Otherness, and in do-
ing so question the long-term utility of valorizing difference as well as
assimilationist approaches to power structures. From this position, this
Article looks closely at the work of two critics, Iris Young 4 and
Genevieve Lloyd,5 in order to draw from their work a dialogue on the
constitution of Whiteness and Otherness in the dominant body, and
to elicit the components of the transformative approach. I advocate
for a communicative ethic, whereby we would have a mode for trans-
formation cognizant of the relational nature of difference, the need
for participation by both marginalized and dominant groups, and the
problems of retaining exclusionary institutions and practices.
Following the establishment of this position, this Article discusses
the Supreme Court's treatment of issues of privilege and sameness/
2. See John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a Stone
of Hope from a Mountain of Despair", 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (1995); KimberlM Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES:
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995); Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Inter-
sectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16 (1995); DAVID
ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS (1994).
3. See Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to
See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, Working Paper No. 189, Wellesley Col-
lege Center for Research on Women (1988), in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW (Leslie Bender
& Daan Braveman eds., 1995).
4. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
5. See GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON: "MALE" AND "FEMALE" IN WESTERN PHI-
LOSOPHY (1984).
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difference. I look at some of the ways the Court has made a difficult
problem even more intractable through the Court's language and as-
sumptions. In problematizing recent Supreme Court decisions, I as-
sert that a profound interrogation of privilege is a prerequisite to
meaningful change in the Court's treatment of privilege.
I. The Problem of Defining Privilege and "Deficit"
The relationship between privilege and non-privilege, or "defi-
cit," is hard to define. Professor Stephanie Wildman defines privilege
as a "systemic conferral of benefit and advantage," triggered not by
merit but by "affiliation, conscious or not and chosen or not, to the
dominant side of a power system."6 In other words, privilege is a sys-
tem by which groups of people actively acquire or passively attach to
reward without earning it, but rather simply by membership in privi-
leged groups. This membership could be in the group of Whites,
heterosexuals, men, or able-bodied persons, or a combination of
these or other categories. That is, individuals and groups can be privi-
leged in society without being all of these, a point which complicates
recognition of privilege. For example, a Black female heterosexual
can access structures of privilege as a heterosexual, even if she cannot
be privileged by her status as a racial minority or as a woman.
If privilege is relatively simple to define, its relational Other is
not. This problem casts doubt upon the validity of a definition of privi-
lege, as well as on the lived meaning or social construction of the
term. French structuralists7 would seek the meaning of privilege in
opposition to other meanings; the significance of a word is located
through contrast. But an opposite to privilege is not readily available.
Contemporary dictionaries do not contain the terms "aprivilege" or
"nonprivilege," nor do these capsules of collective meaning register
the term "unprivilege," which Margalynne Armstrong employs. 8 Privi-
lege is defined without its linguistic Other. The problem is more pro-
nounced when approached from a post-modernist or post-structuralist
orientation to meaning.9 Instead of a spectrum of terms to express the
6. WILDMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 29.
7. See, e.g., Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, in CRITICAL THEORY
SINCE PLATO (Hazard Adams ed., rev. ed. 1992) 718-26.
8. See Margalynne Armstrong, Privilege in Residential Housing, in PRIVILEGE REvEALED,
supra note 1, at 52.
9. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sci-
ences, in CRITIcAL THEORY SINCE PLATO, supra note 7, at 1117-26.
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nature of groups that access systems of privilege at multiple sites, few
sites, or no sites, there is only the term "underprivileged."
The recently popular but subsequently disfavored term "under-
privileged" functions problematically as a linguistic companion to
privilege; it reifies the notion of privilege as normal and unquestiona-
ble. In indirect contrast to privilege, underprivilege is:
[A] kind of special case, to indicate those falling below an assumed
normal level of social existence. It is the assumption of what is nor-
mal that is then the problem, given the verbal continuity of privi-
lege, which in its sense of very specific and positive social advantages
underprivileged can have the effect of obscuring or canceling.10
The continuity of privilege exists, but is not facilitated' by a dis-
crete set of terms. This absence of terms serves to confound the exam-
ination of privilege and its relational Other, both from a structuralist
and a post-modernist orientation. Lacking a vocabulary limits dia-
logue and action.
This dearth of terms has not foreclosed all fashioning of defini-
tions for the Other in the privilege dialogue. In any power system,
from the conservative perspective, the privilege holder is "normal,"
and the groups that cannot access or attach to privilege are "aberrant
or 'alternative""' 1 or "deficit" holders. But these definitions do not
give an account of the complex implications of Otherness.
A. The Function of Privilege: A Brief Explication
Privilege normalizes the dominant body. To explain this, Profes-
sor Wildman offers the example of the workplace as a locale of nor-
malization. Though the term "workplace" seems neutral, it is exclusive
of many locations of work that tend to be performed by women and
people of color, rather than White males. 12 Obvious examples include
childcare and participation in informal economic structures. "Work-
place" does not define either of these types of work, and is indeed
exclusionary of these other work types, but the term survives because
it has the semblance of neutrality. Looking beyond language, Profes-
sor Wildman points out that the behavior expected at workplaces is
White and male, from social behavior between employees to collective
behavior. 13 And laws governing discrimination in the workplace serve
only to compensate the Other for the deficit held; activation of these
10. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEywoRDs: A VocAauLARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 324
(rev. ed. 1983).
11. WILDMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
12. See id. at 27.
13. See id. at 26-27.
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laws creates access to the White male work structure, but does not
transform the workplace.1 4
At the level of system, privilege serves to normalize power struc-
tures. At the level of the individual-or the level at which we can al-
most see privilege-it advantages members and disadvantages non-
members. Members access privilege and receive rewards both passively
and actively. As described by Armstrong, "White privilege involves ad-
vantages and options that are available merely because one is white. A
white person need not be a bigot to benefit from racial privilege; sim-
ply having white skin means having access to neighborhoods and jobs
that are closed to people of color."'15
The manner in which members benefit from privilege is multi-
layered. "First, the characteristics of the privileged group define the
societal norm, often benefiting those in the privileged group. Second,
privileged group members can rely on their privilege and avoid ob-
jecting to oppression."1 6
B. White Innocence: Ignoring Privilege Equates to Racial
Subordination
The notion mentioned above, that privilege holders do not have
to be bigots in order to be implicated in the power systems, raises the
issue of the innocence of Whites.17 That is, as Thomas Ross has articu-
lated, Whites are implicated even as the rhetoric surrounding race
privilege serves to further cleanse Whites of responsibility and even
awareness of their participation in privileging structures.", In Inno-
cence and Affirmative Action, Ross challenges the idea that Whites, are
innocent if they do not actively discriminate against people of color or
otherwise act in a racist manner. 19 Instead, Ross asserts that Whites do
not have innocence because they participate in unconscious racism,
or the "dominant public ideology," which is a system of beliefs con-
structed over time and supportive of unspoken racism. 20 That belief
system, a carriage of stereotypes and preconceptions, pervades society
and dictates behavior that subordinates people of color. "The pres-
14. See id. at 31-32.
15. Armstrong, supra note 8, at 59.
16. WILDMAN, supra note 1, at 13.
17. The concept of White innocence has been discussed by a number of scholars. See,
e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court-Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HArv. L. REv. 78 (1986).
18. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VANO. L. REv. 297 (1990).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 311.
Spring 2000]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
ence and power of unconscious racism is apparent in job interviews,
in social encounters, in courtrooms and conference rooms, and on
the streets." 21
But privilege does not require the conscious participation of
Whites, and it is a mistake to try to locate privilege simply in the psy-
chology of Whites. As I will examine below, privilege is mediated
through structures, language, power, and institutions that always out-
run the control of any given individual. But Whites are nonetheless
implicated in this arrangement by their willingness to see the deficit of
others and to wear the benefit conferred on them by Whiteness.
Further, in the Affirmative Action dialogue, Whites support and
engage in a rhetoric that casts White non-recipients of contracts,
school admission, and jobs as innocent victims. In contrast, the recipi-
ents of these are cast as "takers"22 of something rightfully belonging to
Whites, or the dominant body.
By these three methods, Whites assert their innocence and de-
monize the Other. This perpetuation of systems of privilege translates
into a very real subordination of people of color and other privilege
non-holders. Each of these methods has also been insinuated into
court decisions, having grave implications for civil rights and other
plaintiffs. 23
C. The Damaging Effects of Privilege on Privilege Holders
A further complication to understanding and problematizing
privilege is that it negatively affects not only the "deficit" holders, but
also members of the dominant or privileged body. Peggy McIntosh
writes of her acknowledgement that confronting privilege means ac-
cepting that comforts and gains were not necessarily the result of
good work, that reward does not follow desert.2 4 Recognizing the ne-
cessity of confronting privilege is a difficult task for privilege holders:
"The pressure to avoid it is great, for in facing it I must give up the
myth of meritocracy." 25
According to McIntosh, a privilege holder's participation in and
confrontation of the myth of a meritocracy is more complex than
21. Id. at 313.
22. See id. at 315.
23. The insinuation of the rhetoric of innocence into contemporary jurisprudence is
addressed more fully, infra Part III.
24. See McIntosh, supra note 3, at 27.
25. Id.
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could be reversed by this single act of self-reflection. 26 Awareness and
confrontation of the myth is, in fact, traumatic because it doesn't
merely provide the justification for or command to undo present cir-
cumstances and avoid attaching to privilege in the future; the con-
frontation of privilege also requires an exposure and
problematization of a legacy of values that have constituted privilege
holders. Writing about White privilege in particular but not in isola-
tion, McIntosh states:
We need more understanding of the ways in which white "privi-
lege" damages white people, for these are not the same ways in
which it damages the victimized. Skewed white psyches are an in-
separable part of the picture, though I do not want to confuse the
kinds of damage done to the holders of special assets and to those
who suffer the deficits. 27
One inhibitor to confrontation on the part of privilege holders is
their denial and search for other explanations for their status. As
Martha Minow explains:
[T] here is an assumption that the existing social and economic ar-
rangements are natural and neutral. If workplaces and living ar-
rangements are natural, they are inevitable. It follows, then, that
differences in the work and home lives of particular individuals are
because of personal choice. We presume that individuals are free,
unhampered by the status quo, when they form their own prefer-
ences and act upon them. From this view, any departure from the
status quo risks nonneutrality and interference with free choice. 28
Attempts to reconcile the notions of Otherness and free choice
have resulted in the limited, compensatory models of altering power
structures, such as Affirmative Action programs, which receive full ex-
amination in a latter section of this article in which the courts' treat-
ment of these issues is problematized. 29
D. Working Against Privileging Systems: A Critical Approach
Because privilege is inscribed into our relationships, language,
and law, it may seem to be an impossible task to undo it. And, if sys-
tems of privilege are undone, would this also obliterate useful compo-
nents of the structure? How can the bad be discerned from the good,
if it is so pervasive and entrenched? Does the recognition of privilege
require the complete dismantling of all existing structures, or simply
26. See id.
27. Id. at 31.
28. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference, in POWER, PRMVLEGE AND LAW, supra note
3, at 93.
29. See infra Part III.A.
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access to these structures by marginalized groups? Several critics offer
approaches to privilege that stop short of entirely dismantling all ex-
isting structures. These approaches, alone or in combination, can be
seen to address the ill fit of the Other into the dominant, to borrow
Genevieve Lloyd's ideas, 30 but do not promote either relativism or
assimilationism.
One approach is to begin to look at power structures critically.
Martha Minow advocates for a critical position characterized not by
mere tolerance or celebration of multiple perspectives, but, instead,
by an attention to the tensions between different perspectives. 3' She
asserts that a critical position is ultimately a more productive position,
writing:
Some say that moral relativism results if we solicit and celebrate the
view of those who have been excluded, degraded, or oppressed.
Surely, this celebration of multiplicity topples the hierarchy that
canonized one set of experiences as the norm. Yet the demand for
that kind of pluralism does not and should not suspend the cri-
tique of power relationships that motivate it. 3 2
Another approach, very similar to that taken by Minow, is to
make privilege visible. Rebecca Aanerud calls this exposure of racial
dominance the "interruption of Whiteness." 33 She advocates for this
as an approach to reading texts, both texts that omit race in assump-
tion of Whiteness and texts that approach race non-critically. 34
Aanerud proposes that all reading be done critically, in confrontation
of Whiteness, and in that way privilege structures are made more
visible.3 5
The utility of this visibility approach, as a first step toward con-
fronting privileging forces, hegemony, and the myth of monolithic
Whiteness, is embraced, too, by Ruth Frankenberg. In regard to tex-
tual analysis, Frankenberg argues that this confrontation will expose
the ways in which Whiteness is continuously reinforced as the norm,
as neutral, or "doxa."3 6 If the seemingly normal Whiteness is not ques-
30. See LLOYD, supra note 5, at 101.
31. See Minow, supra note 28, at 93.
32. See Martha Minow, PartialJustice and Minorities, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra
note 3, at 16, 17.
33. Rebecca Aanerud, Fictions of Whiteness: Speaking the Names of Whiteness in U.S. Litera-
ture, in DISPLACING WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICISM 42, 43 (Ruth
Frankenberg ed., 1997).
34. See id. at 56-57.
35. See id.
36. Ruth Frankenberg, Introduction: Local Whitenesses, Localizing Whiteness, in DISPLAC-
ING WHITENESS, supra note 33 at 15-16.
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tioned, according to Frankenberg, it will continue to be the domi-
nant, subordinating actor.
Making privilege visible is only a first step, as Professor Wildman
acknowledges: "Once the hierarchy is made visible, the problems re-
main no less complex, but it becomes possible to discuss them in a
more revealing and useful fashion." 37
The complexity of the problem, and of the theoretical discourse
surrounding the problem of privilege, should not result in stasis. That
is, responses to the power structure are available and should be imple-
mented, even if they do not represent a complete solution. The search
for a total solution not only should not stand in the way of action. It
also should be built on a consciousness that attempts to abandon sys-
tems that altogether cannot leave the Other "intact" as Lloyd reads de
Beauvoir to articulate.38
II. Taking the Critical Approach Further: Decentering
Whiteness and Addressing the Dilemmas of Sameness
and Difference
A. Reason and Individualism: Civil Rights Ideals or Exclusionary
Mechanisms?
Part of the White gaze is making the racial Other the racial Other
without seeing how that also helps to constitute Whiteness. This move
not only normalizes Whiteness but places the impossible burden on
the racial Other to become equal by becoming like Whites-that is,
raceless. 39 The appeal of this transparent norm is seductive. As Blacks
and others have been excluded, subordinated, and marginalized for
apparently being different, there has been a powerful pull to address
these issues, by both the excluded group as well as the dominant
group, by making Blacks just like Whites.40 Of course, the language of
sameness is expressed in terms of being treated the same or just like
everyone else. Until recently, it was hardly noticed that the sameness
that is being held up as a universal norm is in fact a specific White
norm.41 The specificity of this White gaze has been hidden in the lan-
37. WILDMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 24.
38. See LLoyD, supra note 5, at 102.
39. See generally THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE, VOLUME
ONE: RACIAL OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1994); YOUNG, supra note 4.
40. For a good critique of this position, see generally Marilyn Frye, Oppression, in
POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995).
41. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Random Notes of
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guage of Enlightenment claims, such as objectivity, rationalism, and
universalism. It is not surprising, then, that challenges to the universal
claims associated with Whiteness are attacked as undermining objec-
tivity, reason, and standards.
The attack on the Enlightenment claim of objectivity, the role of
reason, and the perspectiveless claim of its totalizing story have been
under attack almost since its founding.42 The role of reason, and
other foundational universal claims, was not just a philosophical issue,
but was bound up with the way society rationalized and excluded wo-
men, racial minorities, and other marginalized groups. But as the
dominant language and justification for these groups took hold, the
argument for inclusion was frequently cast in the same dominant dis-
course. Women and racial minorities and their advocates tried to
demonstrate that women and racial minorities were indeed capable of
the apparent mental and non-mental characteristics prerequisite to
membership in society.
Often these arguments took on absurd forms. One example is the
discussion as to whether slaves, as property, were or were not capable
of reasoned human process and, therefore, could form the necessary
mens rea to commit certain crimes like murder. Another example was
the debate as to whether women could participate in society as public
figures without the supervision of a man. The argument about the
place of these subordinated groups in society was often framed on the
sameness/difference axis. One position was that if, indeed, women
and Blacks were different, they were appropriately limited in terms of
societal participation. This reasoning became a vehicle of inclusionary
practices; those who championed the inclusion of marginalized
groups often did so by asserting that members of these groups could
perform the tasks or had the traits requisite and identical to those
already included in the dominant society.
At a time when the ideal of equality was taking root, there was a
strong need to explain who was not included in the apparent univer-
salizing reach of equality. In the important but controversial book
an Integration Warrior-Part 2: A Critical Response to the Hegemonic "Truth" of Daniel Farber and
Suzanna Sherry, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1589 (1999).
42. The height of the claim for the objective universal function of reason was epito-
mized by such philosophers as Kant and Descartes. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE
OF PURE REASON (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood trans. & ed., 1998); RUNE DESCARTES, DiS-
COURSE ON METHOD: AND, THE MEDITATIONS (F. E. Sutcliffe trans., 1968) But, almost imme-
diately, these claims were challenged by philosophers like Hegel. See generally GEORG W.F.
HEGEL, REASON IN HISTORY: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
(Robert S. Hartman trans., 1953).
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White Over Black,43 Winthrop Jordan argues that it was the need to
justify slavery and the exclusion of Blacks at the time of the spread of
the rhetoric of equality that helped to coalesce the ideology of racism
and the racialized excluded Other.44 This simultaneous process of in-
clusion and exclusion was notjust descriptive of how members of soci-
ety functioned or were to function in society, it was also constitutive.
The Enlightenment project that rhetorically championed the equality
of White males was also the justification for the subordination of
Others. The Othering of Blacks, American Indians, and women was
essential in the making of White males.45 The challenge, then, to
Whiteness is more than an aberration requiring marginalized groups
to tinker at the edge of an otherwise rational, free society.
B. The Sameness/Difference Debate: Should Everyone Be Treated
the Same?
The process of arguing about the sameness and difference of
marginalized groups has and continues to be a central part of the pub-
lic and private discourse. The consequences of the argument have
been extraordinary. Those who would support inclusion have been
forced into arguing that members of the disfavored subordinated
group are the same as everyone else. 46 But, as Frye and Minow have
noted, this means being the same, or different, than some assumed
norm.47 This unstated norm through most of our history has been the
norm of Whiteness and maleness. One should not assume that the
norm of Whiteness and maleness is necessarily the same as actual
White men.
The apparent logic of the sameness/difference discourse under
the dominant meaning of equality is this: people who are the same
should be treated the same, or equally, and people who are different
should be treated differently.48 The liberalizing role of this schematic
is that as we come to accept that we are all apparently the same-
43. WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NE-
GRO 1550-1812 (1968).
44. See id.
45. See id.; see also KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
46. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 4; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw (1987); MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY,
POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1997); Frye, supra note 40.
47. See YOUNG, supra note 4; see also Minow, supra note 32.
48. See generally john a. powell, The "Racing" of American Society: Race Functioning as a
Verb Before Signifying a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 99 (1997).
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reasoning, autonomous, rights-holding individuals-then we can all
make claims to equal treatment.
Given the powerful, damaging function of the rhetoric of differ-
ence, it is not surprising that the rhetoric of sameness has appeal. I
have argued that in our society the sameness/difference debate is
predicated on White supremacy.49 One who is not the same as the
White norm is both different and inferior, and therefore can be ex-
cluded. On the other hand, if one wants to, one can seek sameness by
being like the White norm. The sting of this position becomes clear
when we realize that the very Whiteness that the Other is being called
to emulate is constitutively anti-Black. 50 Whiteness not only has a rela-
tionship to Blackness; this relationship is both hierarchical and
oppositional.
What if individuals and groups are different? The sameness/dif-
ference approach suggests that it is appropriate that the different be
excluded or in some other way subordinated. To treat people the
same who are in fact different would be to give them special treat-
ment, thereby violating the requirement of equality that is fundamen-
tal to the logic. 51 This is what one writer refers to as the dilemma of
sameness and difference. 52
How are we to address this dilemma? We have largely failed to
recognize its existence, and this failure of recognition is one compo-
nent of the dilemma. Part of the racing process is taking the language
and culture away from the dominated group, subjecting them to what
one writer calls a social death.5 3 The dominated group is then left to
try to reclaim its humanity through the very language and social prac-
tices that have defined it as less than, or inferior to the dominant
group.
The subordinated and marginalized groups that work to reclaim
humanity are caught in the same dilemmas. In response, some call for
assimilation. While the "passing" of the late nineteenth and early
49. See john a. powell, "Is Racial Integration Essential to Achieving Quality Education for
Low-Income Minority Students, In the Short Term? In the Long Term? 5 POVERTY & RACE 7 (Sep-
tember/October 1996).
50. See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND
THE UNDERCLASS (1992).
51. This argument will be very familiar to those who claim that Affirmative Action is
both unfair and illegal. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 41.
52. SeeJoan Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond
Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theoy, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW (Leslie Bender
& Daan Braveman eds., 1995).
53. See ALLEN, supra note 39, at 35.
[Vol. 34
twentieth century has fallen out of favor, the passing of today takes the
form of the assertion of "pure" individualism, stripped of race and
gender. But this notion of the individual is an ideological fiction, re-
flective of the image of male Whiteness, and still situated in the assimi-
lationist position. While it may be true that we are all individuals, it is
certainly not true that any one of us is just individual.54
In Racist Culture, David Goldberg explores how the concept of the
individual as an ideological claim was used in derogation of the collec-
tive social arrangements of the Irish, indigenous people, and Blacks. 55
The concept was used against those groups as part of a process of
White-making and Other-making. By this process, the concept of the
individual was racialized. 56 It is not surprising, then, that women and
racial minorities may experience the weight of their womanness or
their Blackness and long for the seeming weightlessness of White
maleness, or freedom to be just an unencumbered individual.
Robin West makes a similar observation, provocatively stating that
women are not human beings if "human being" means a rational, au-
tonomous individual. 57 Like West, a number of theorists steeped in
the language of privilege have begun to challenge the assumption of
assimilation. I will return to the discussion of assimilation below, and
suggest that there are some forms of assimilation that avoid forms of
passing and may not be as problematic.
C. Is Valorization of Difference the Answer?
The other part of this dilemma is to recognize the maleness and
Whiteness of this norm of the rational, autonomous individual and
therefore reject it. In race discourse, this means rejecting what is ap-
parently White as well as rejecting the call for assimilation-which can
only be understood as a form of both passing and self-denial-or ac-
cepting and valorizing one's difference. 58 Similarly, in gender, women
may claim their difference from men and define it as positive.
The dilemma attached to sameness is also a dilemma attached to
difference, and, therefore, is not so easily resolved. The heart of this
dilemma is that the Other is still caught in the dominant discourse
and structure, whether one embraces the assimilationist/sameness
54. Seejohn a. powell, Talking Race, 31 HUNGRY MIND REV. 15 (1994).
55. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF MEAN-
ING (1993).
56. See id.
57. See Robin West, Jurisprudence & Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
58. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L. J. 758, 761-62 (1990).
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side of the paradigm or the separatist, self-determinist/difference part
of the paradigm. This may seem counter-intuitive. Indeed, many of
the apparently more radical members of marginalized groups have
adopted this stance of claiming and valorizing the "deviant" character-
istics that the dominant discourse names as both Other and negative. I
remember growing up and receiving the message that to be Black was
negative. Part of the message of the Black Power movement was to
claim and reclaim the positive aspects of being Black. But, even after
having tentatively accepted the positive possibilities of Blackness,
there still was the negative connotation with Africanness. The move to
redefine Black American as African-American was a further move to
both redefine and reclaim an identity in opposition to the dominant
discourse. But how does one know which part of the anti-White stance
will reflect a positive or negative position for marginalized groups?
Consider the educational setting. It has been noted that a number of
African-Americans, especially males, define doing well academically as
White, and, therefore, work to avoid the stigma of Whiteness by doing
poorly in school.5 9
We have witnessed a similar shift in the gay and lesbian commu-
nity with the embracing of the word "Queer."60 All of these moves are
more than simply the renaming of a people. They are political and
cultural maneuvers that attempt to create a space not allowed in the
dominant discourse. 61 For much of our nation's history, Whites, and
White males in particular, have been the subject that has "raced" the
racial Other.62 Oppositional efforts to valorize what has been deni-
grated by the dominant society are an attempt to challenge the racing
or Othering process. Attempts have consisted of claiming a voice as a
subject in opposition to the dominant discourse. But voice is often
trapped within the unexamined language and symbols of the domi-
nant group that it wishes to reject.
Despite the fact that such a move may not be as destabilizing of
Whiteness as we would like, we nonetheless hear strong opposition
from the assimilationist stance. The dominant discourse is littered
with statements like: "Why do they want to call themselves Black? They
aren't really Black." Negative or resistant reactions have come, too,
59. See Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students' School Success: Coping with
the "Burden of 'Acting White'", 18 URn. REv. 176, 177 (1986).
60. See Lisa Duggan, Making It Perfectly Queer, 22 SOCIALIST REv. 11 (1992), reprinted in
SEX WARS 155 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter eds., 1995).
61. See Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification, 15 Law
& INEQ.J. 7 (1997).
62. See powell, supra note 48.
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from Blacks, including Justice Marshall, who for some time refused to
embrace this shift.6 3
Indeed, the discussion of the radical Other and the reformist
Other often takes place around the appropriateness of assimilation
versus separation. This strategy of renaming is also associated with an
anti-assimilationist stance, and sometimes an explicitly separatist
stance. 64 In the Black Power movement and the radical feminist move-
ment, there was-and in many cases remains-a separatist force.
Again, I should be clear that, in terms of strategy, marginalized groups
may need to explore all or any of these approaches. But, if these strat-
egies are not part of a larger plan, or are seen as an end in themselves
as opposed to being a strategy, they will continue to suffer from the
sameness/difference dilemma. This may make what seems like a radi-
cal move from the dominant discourse be, in actuality, a strategy
firmly embedded in and derivative of the dominant discourse. To the
extent that they remain only oppositional, or try to assimilate as an
end, they also remain dependent on the dominant discourse that they
seek to challenge. Indeed, this is the other part of the dilemma of
sameness/difference.
D. Decentering Whiteness Is the Best Approach to Race Privilege
Challenging the dominant discourse requires disturbing and
decentering the White gaze. This means first naming it and then en-
gaging it. Once it is engaged, the task is to deeply interrogate and
challenge the claims associated with it.
The current evolving discourse on privilege and Whiteness exem-
plified in the work of Professor Wildman and others is part of the
process of decentering Whiteness. Development of this discourse is a
critical first step. The failure to make the universal norm of Whiteness
opaque leaves the privilege of Whiteness invisible both to Whites and
people of color alike.65 The normalcy of male Whiteness, while ob-
63. Marshall insisted on calling himself and other Blacks "Negro" for some time, chal-
lenging the appropriateness of the terms "Black" and "African American." See Peter Linzer,
White Liberal Looks at Racist Speech, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 187, 214 n.121 (1991).
64. The anti-assimilation position was and still is often confused with an anti-integra-
tionist movement. In much of the popular debate, these terms are used interchangeably.
But true integration is not the same as assimilation. Seejohn powell, Segregation and Educa-
tional Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools, 17 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 337, 353-54
(1996). One can also think of assimilation from either a transformative perspective or from
more narrow perspectives. SeeYOUNG, supra note 4. The confusion of these terms has made
the discourse on these issues more torrent than needed.
65. Of course, the universality and normalcy of Whiteness was never complete. If it
were, there would be no counter story or challenge to the dominant discourse. At times,
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scuring the privilege of Whiteness, does not obscure the lack of the
racial or gendered Other. Indeed, what this normalized structure does
is name the failure of Blacks and women as a failure that has little to
do with Whites. So, not only must the excluded Other then suffer
both the material and cultural oppression caused by this exclusion
and domination, but the other must also shoulder the responsibility
for it.
Whites and White institutions are perceived to be not responsible
for this failure. Rather, they are held up as the ideal to which the
racial and gendered Other must strive in order to attain full member-
ship in society. Along with the material and cultural benefits associ-
ated with Whiteness, Whites are also given a story about the
undeservedness of Blacks as contrasted with or entirely unrelated to
White innocence. 66 White male innocence is clearly the dominant
rhetoric of the Supreme Court as it contends with racial justice and
affirmative action issues. 67 This story then becomes a powerful justifi-
cation for not only maintaining the racial status quo, but also sug-
gesting that any effort to intervene in the status quo is itself unjust.68
E. The Deficit Story That Is Told About Blacks
What I am suggesting is that the decentering of Whiteness and
the exposure of the White gaze must occur either prior to or concur-
rently with a strategic effort to separate or assimilate into society.
There may be resistance to this, as it may appear that this attempt
requires refocusing on White people, instead of marginalized groups
focusing on themselves. But that is not what I am suggesting. The
dominant language is not just the language that Whites use; it is the
language that we all use. The dominant language is both the Black
and White language. Focusing on the failure of Blacks without consid-
ering the privilege of Whites and Whiteness, and the relationship be-
tween Black and White status in society, leads to locating the problem
in Blacks. While Blacks may indeed have problems, the heart of the
problem is the dominant discourse itself and the deficit story it tells of
Blacks, and the innocence story it tells of Whites.69
society has enforced the material and cultural logic of this dominant story by brute force
and threats. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 2.
66. See Ross, supra note 18.
67. See, e.g., Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
68. See the language to this effect in Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (1994), and
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
69. See Crenshaw, supra note 2.
[Vol. 34
RACIAL PRIVILEGE
The deficit story goes something like this. There is nothing wrong
with the institutional and structural arrangement of society. In fact,
there is hardly an acknowledgement that we have a structural arrange-
ment. To the extent that this is acknowledged, we assume it is neutral
and fair. By fair, it is assumed that we all have an equal opportunity to
achieve in our society. What White males have they deserve by force of
individual commitment and hard work. Those that don't have lack
because of personal failure. Indeed, they have what they deserve. 70 For
policy-makers to consider race, then, is both wrong and violative of
liberalism and the civil rights goal of being treated as an individual.71
Toni Morrison encourages us to examine the way the history of
slavery and racism have marked and scarred White people. 72 Peggy
McIntosh writes about the invisible knapsack that Whites are given. I
envision that in that knapsack are versions of this story that allow
Whites to rationalize and feel innocent in the face of racial oppression
and exclusion: "If only Blacks would change their family structure."
This story is augmented by claims that other groups that started at the
bottom have made it without special dispensation-groups such as the
Jews or the Irish.73
Despite the telling and the retelling of these stories in schools,
churches, on television, in the popular media, and in public and pri-
vate discussions, there are cracks in the stories. These stories are being
challenged by a counter-story of privilege, Whiteness, and relational-
ism. The story of the individual making it in a value neutral society has
its underpinning in the Enlightenment claim of universal norms, ob-
jectivism, and neutral, ahistoric foundations. The attack on these En-
lightenment claims have been present since their inception. In law,
legal realists were some of the first to challenge the claim of the objec-
tivity in law. Late modernism and postmodernism in politics and phi-
losophy continue to interrogate and put forth the dubious
assumptions of these claims. As people of color and women have
gained political voice, many have used this new voice to assert
counter-stories to autonomy, reason, and individuality. Even as liber-
alism tries to accommodate challenges to Enlightenment without re-
70. SeeJENCKS, supra note 50; JUDY H. KATZ, WHITE AWARENESS: HANDBOOK FOR ANTI-
RACISM TRAINING (1978).
71. Seejohn a. powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Reconsidered,
31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789 (1997).
72. See generally TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK (1992).
73. For a counter-story about the Jews making it without help, see Karen Brodkin
Sacks, How Did Jews Become White Folks?, in RACE 78 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjeck eds.,
1994).
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linquishing core principles, the challenges persist and are likely only
to intensify.
These struggles have not just stayed in the limited domain of phi-
losophers. The fight of muticulturalism and the culture wars show that
these issues are touching increasing numbers of our political commu-
nity as more people notice their absence from or low status in the
dominant discourse. It is not clear what the result of these challenges
will be, but the disembodied, rational, transcendent, autonomous in-
dividual is probably behind us.
For those of us who have taken the counter-story by Professor
Wildman and others seriously, we must turn to the question, not
whether unjustified White male privilege exists, but having caught a
glimpse of it, how should it be discussed and interrogated? We must
refuse to be trapped in the deficit story, even a story that calls for
asserting the positive aspects of these deficits.7 4
F. Interrogation of the Sameness/Difference Debate;
Understanding Difference as Relational, and Embracing
the Transformative Model
One only reinscribes the sameness/otherness dilemma by simply
accepting or rejecting the terms as they are. But, then, how is one to
think about this dilemma? It is this issue on which I will focus now. I
will try to show that sameness and difference must not be seen as bipo-
lar and oppositional, but as relational and mutually constitutive. I will
emphasize the importance of a transformative model to addressing
privilege, as opposed to the assimilationist or conformist model on
one hand or the separatist/opposition model on the other. To do this
more expansive critique than that presented already in this article, I
will draw upon the writings of Iris Young and Genevieve Lloyd.
I have asserted above that one does not address the dilemma by
either simply gaining access to the privileging structure or by simply
adopting what could be called either an oppositional or inverted
stance. There are many examples of Blacks, women, and other
marginalized groups that have adopted a variation of these two posi-
tions. There are those who fight to assimilate into the existing power
structure. While under the present configuration this effort should be
supported, it remains a limited strategy that is likely to both reinforce
74. Notice that I am not calling for a rejection or an embracing of what is considered
the norm. It is not so easy to understand what our relationship to these norms should be.
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and legitimate the existing structure of privilege. But, my primary con-
cern lies with clarifying the dilemma and starting to move beyond it.
The dilemma is essentially this: the assimilationist model purports
to give everyone the same right to become the male White norm that
is constituted by the negation of the Other.7 5 This position has been
the one that has received the most criticism, which has sometimes led
to rejecting assimilation and the norms associated with it. But to valor-
ize our Otherness in opposition to this White male norm is to ignore
that our very Otherness is intricately bound up in this norm. Even
though it may appear to be a break from the established norm to
claim what was seen as negative and weak because of its otherness as,
instead, positive and strong, this may reassert the dominance of the
dominant discourse at a more profound level.
There are a number of ways of thinking about this problem. I will
focus on two. The first is to think of this problem as largely a distribu-
tion problem.7 6 If structures, practices, and norms are reflective of the
favored and disfavored status of members of society, simply accessing
these distributive structures does not disestablish hierarchy or privi-
lege. Iris Young draws attention to this problem in her important
book, Justice and the Politics of Difference.77
The other way of thinking about this problem is as a constitutive
problem. Language, norms, and culture that generate the hierarchy
are constitutive of both the dominant group and the marginalized
group, and their relationship. Genevieve Lloyd calls attention to this
in her important book, The Man of Reason.78
I turn first to Young and the distributive problem of this di-
lemma. In addressing this dilemma, Young starts by naming and criti-
quing the assimilation model. She acknowledges that, even under the
assimilationalist model, there has been substantial progress toward an
emancipatory ideal, especially in opposition to exclusion based on
natural inferiority:
There is no question that the ideal of liberation as the elimination
of group difference has been enormously important in the history
of emancipatory politics. The ideal of universal humanity that de-
nies natural differences has been a crucial historical development
in the struggle against exclusion and status differentiation ....
75. See YOUNG, supra note 4; LLOYD, supra note 5.
76. Iris Young recognizes the distributive approach as the one most heavily relied
upon by justice theorists, and she is explicitly critical of this approach. See YOUNG, supra
note 4.
77. Id.
78. LLOYD, supra note 5.
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The assimilationist ideal retains significant rhetorical power in the
face of continued beliefs in the essentially different and inferior
natures of women, Blacks, and other groups. 79
In naming the assimilationist ideal, Young distinguishes between
what she calls the conformist model and the transformative model of
assimilation.8 0 In the conformist model:
[S] tatus quo institutions and norms are assumed as given, and dis-
advantaged groups who differ from those norms are expected to
conform to them. A transformational ideal of assimilation, on the
other hand, recognizes that institutions as given express the inter-
ests and perspectives of the dominant groups. Achieving assimila-
tion therefore requires altering many institutions and practices in
accordance with neutral rules that truly do not disadvantage or
stigmatize any person, so that group membership really is irrele-
vant to how persons are treated."'
The transformative model is more emancipatory than the con-
formist model because it recognizes that simply distributing benefits
based upon institutional practices, where the hierarchy and group
norms are embedded in the institution, reproduces domination at
deeper and more subtle levels. Young criticizes the present way we
approach affirmative action as an example of conformist assimilation.
Even though transformative assimilation is substantially better than
conformist assimilation, it remains flawed, according to Young,8 2 be-
cause it is still based on the assumption that there is no space in our
legal or political system for recognition of positive difference that
should support different treatment.8 3 Young's transformative assimila-
tion is not the assimilation against which most theorists write. She is
not assuming that the Other must become like the dominant norm
under this model, but that both the Other and the dominant norm
will participate in the creation of new norms and institutions.8 4
Young's objection to this model is that it still does not leave room for
groups and group differences.
Young asserts that the dominant culture of liberal individualism
must be relativist, making room for other value, including the recog-
79. YOUNG, supra note 4, at 159. Because racism and other forms of exclusion and
subordination reflect a set of practices, they change. See powell, supra note 48; Omi, supra
note 61; WILLIAMS, supra note 10; Crenshaw, supra note 2; and GOLDBERG, supra note 55.
This also means that the strategies to challenge these practices must also change. See Cren-
shaw, supra note 2; GOLDBERG, supra note 55.
80. See YOUNG, supra note 4, at 165.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 166.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 167-68.
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nition of groups.8 5 Young calls for embracing what she terms the
"politics of difference. ' 86 By positively claiming difference, one may be
backing into the sameness/difference dilemma:
Since those asserting group specificity certainly wish to affirm the
liberal humanist principle that all persons are of equal moral
worth, they appear to be faced with a dilemma. Analyzing W.E.B.
Du Bois's arguments for cultural pluralism, Bernard Boxill poses
the dilemma this way: "On the one hand, we must overcome segre-
gation because it denies the idea of human brotherhood; on the
other hand, to overcome segregation we must self-segregate and
therefore also deny the idea of human brotherhood." Martha Mi-
now finds a dilemma of difference facing any who seek to promote
justice for currently oppressed or disadvantaged groups. Formally
neutral rules and policies that ignore group differences often per-
petuate the disadvantage of those whose difference is defined as
deviant; but focusing on difference risks recreating the stigma that
difference has carried in the past.
These dilemmas are genuine, and exhibit the risks of collective
life, where the consequences of one's claims, actions, and policies may
not turn out as one intended because others have understood them
differently or turned them to different ends.87
Young believes that part of the dilemma is caused by the universal
gaze of dominant culture that defines the Other in opposition and
subordination to the values and characteristics of the norm. This infi-
nite Other, then, is not seen in relation to the values and characteris-
tics of the universal self, because these universal values are seen as
valueless or neutral. This approach fails to see how the included
groups are privileged. Instead, it draws attention to the lack, or deficit,
of the excluded, subordinated groups:
In the objectifying ideologies of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and
homophobia, only the oppressed and excluded groups are defined
as different. Whereas the privileged groups are neutral and exhibit
free and malleable subjectivity, the excluded groups are marked
with an essence, imprisoned in a given set of possibilities. By virtue
of the characteristics the group is alleged to have by nature, the
ideologies allege that group members have specific dispositions
that suit them for some activities and not others. Difference in
these ideologies always means exclusionary opposition to a norm.
There are rational men, and then there are women; there are civi-
lized men, and then there are wild and savage peoples. The mark-
ing of difference always implies a good/bad opposition; it is always
85. See id. at 166.
86. Id. at 163.
87. Id. at 169 (citations omitted).
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a devaluation, the naming of an inferiority in relation to a superior
standard of humanity.88
The anti-essentialist struggles of women and people of color can
be recast as efforts to break out of the essentialist entrapment of the
universal gaze of the dominant culture. But, as such groups try to
claim their humanity through the lens of liberal individualism, they
run the risk of transporting the sameness/difference dilemma into
the individual essentialism debate. And, indeed, this debate has occu-
pied most of the discourse as marginalized groups have struggled to
reconstitute their humanity.
Professor Daniel Ortiz argues that many legal theorists who have
adopted the post-modern critique of the sovereign subject have done
so incompletely, and have ended up reproducing the errors of liberal
individualism. As an alternative to "metaphysical individualism," they
end up positing "discrete and monolithic" communities, of which in-
dividuals are expressions. He suggests that the sameness/difference
and essentialism/anti-essentialism controversies in feminist legal the-
ory are actually debates over the two characterizing features of these
categorical communities. "At bottom, the sameness/difference debate
concerns the discreteness of men and women, while the essentialism/
antiessentialism debate concerns the monolithicness of gender iden-
tity."89 Sameness/difference asks whether groups are largely similar or
different, essentialism/anti-essentialism asks the same question within
a particular community: Are people within a group largely similar or
different?" o
In the sameness/difference debate, liberal feminists take the
sameness side, believing that women are fundamentally no different
from men, and thus should enjoy the same freedoms men enjoy and
the same power to enjoy it. Difference feminists hold that women dif-
fer fundamentally from men, either because of biology (as per Robin
West) or because they reason and value differently (as per, for exam-
ple, Carol Gilligan). According to Ortiz, the debate between liberal
and difference feminists is really a debate about discreteness. "To
what extent are men and women really different, and how deeply do
their differences matter? Does it make more sense to think of men
88. Id. at 170.
89. Daniel R. Ortiz, Categorical Community, 51 STAN. L. Rav. 769, 796 (1999) (emphasis
added).
90. See id. at 802.
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and women as humans with superficial differences or as members of
separate groups who sometimes exhibit superficial similarities?"9 1
To Ortiz, feminist theory's most successful attempts to resolve the
sameness/difference conflict have sought either to break down the
opposition by localizing it or to overcome the opposition by analyzing
it politically.92 Joan Williams, who takes the first course, argues that
women and men are both alike and different, and thus for some pur-
poses they should be treated the same, and for others they should be
treated differently. Williams urges throwing away any global descrip-
tion of men and women as either the same or different and instead
settling for the messy and contentious task of describing individual
features of their lives one way or another. Catharine MacKinnon's
political dominance feminism goes beyond sameness/difference by
looking at the overall standing of men and women. 93 Sameness and
difference do not matter; what matters is whether existing social prac-
tices devalue women, regardless of how those practices treat men.94
However, as Mary Anne Case notes, in critically evaluating whether a
social practice subordinates them, women must at some point ask how
men are privileged by it.9 5 Ortiz concludes that, "[w]hile giving up
discreteness may disable us from making striking claims, like West's,
about men and women, it may allow us better to discover and under-
stand both groups' actual needs and values. '96
Ortiz notes that community matters to identity in ways traditional
liberal legal theory cannot account for: "[A]t least partly [it] consti-
tute [s] the individual and is not wholly reflective of unencumbered
individual choice. ' 97 However, categorical communities-ones ;which
are both monolithic and discrete-lead to many problems. First, as
feminist and many critical race theorists have pointed out, most com-
mon identity categories are anything but monolithic. Second, mono-
lithic identity categories entail certain kinds of politics. By enlisting
members of the group behind their "common" concerns, members of
the group who match this description-usually those who created the
91. Id. at 797.
92. See id. at 799.
93. See id. (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW (1987)).
94. See id. at 800.
95. See id. (citing Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orienta-
tion: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 102 n.359
(1995)).
96. Id. at 801.
97. Id. at 803.
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category-are privileged, while those who are different are marginal-
ized. Third, most common identity groups are not discrete: identity is
multifaceted, complex, and highly provisional, and describing a per-
son as a member of only one group fundamentally misdescribes him
or her.98
Nonetheless, Ortiz recognizes the persistence of categorical com-
munity, which he attributes to its power as a political tool. "Its simplify-
ing assumptions-in particular, that each person belongs in only one
community and that each community is everywhere the same-are ex-
actly what allow it to do its political work."99 Assuming discreteness
and monolithicness avoids messy and contentious intellectual analyses
that can frustrate political identification and activity. Second, these
simplifying assumptions allow the theory to purport to say more: "In
particular, discreteness obviates any need to worry about judgments
across communities and allows one to identify individuals as manifes-
tations of a single group. Monolithicness, on the other hand, allows
one to identify every member of the community as identical in all im-
portant ways with every other member."100 Together, these two as-
sumptions create an almost automatic political entitlement and
empowerment.
Recounting Judith Butler's description of the totalization per-
formed by identity categories as a "necessary error," Ortiz questions its
necessity.' 10 By recognizing, and thus empowering groups that fail to
actually represent the interests of many of their putative members,
categorical community injures many of those members individually,
and collectively disempowers the other communities they inhabit. The
answer, according to Ortiz, is not the current proliferation of categori-
cal identities allowing a person to escape one categorical community
in situations where it did not address certain concerns, by asserting
allegiance to another that better describes the person for a particular
purpose. 10 2 Instead of simplifying identity in dangerous ways, Ortiz
98. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Borders (En)gendered: Normativities, La-
tinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 882 (1997).
99. Ortiz, supra note 89, at 804.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 805 (citing Judith Butler, Critically Queer, in BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE
DIScuRSIvE LIMITS OF "SEx" 223, 225 (1993).
102. Unfortunately, this type of serial integration overlooks how people actually
find themselves. Identity is complex but not in this protean way. Most of us do not
shift dynamically from one simple totalizing description to another. More of us
assume instead one complex identity for a period of time. This complex identity
is dynamic, of course, because the many different communities a person may in-
habit at any one time exert constantly changing claims over his identity.
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calls on us to disaggregate and refine it-that is, to acknowledge com-
munities as fundamentally important but also as messily complex.
This type of analytic move would not make an identity politics im-
possible but would make its arguments more complex, difficult,
and open to disagreement. That may be the price, however, of
making identity politics more responsive to the needs and values of
the individuals for whom it purports to speak.10 3
Iris Young argues that the way to address this dilemma is neither
by assimilation nor by embracing the oppositional stance of group dif-
ference, but, rather, to recognize difference as relational instead of
oppositional:
In this relational understanding, the meaning of difference also
becomes contextualized. Group differences will be more or less sa-
lient depending on the groups compared, the purposes of the
comparison, and the point of view of the comparers. Such contex-
tualized understandings of difference undermine essentialist as-
sumptions. For example, in the context of athletics, health care,
social service support, and so on, wheelchair-bound people are dif-
ferent from others, but they are not different in many other re-
spects. Traditional treatment of the disabled entailed exclusion
and segregation because the differences between the disabled and
able-bodied were conceptualized as extending to all or most
capacities. 10 4
Both Ortiz and Young seem to take a pragmatic view of this prob-
lem, but Young reminds us that the focus on essentialism may be in
part an inadequate response to the universal claim of the White gaze.
Young, then, would seem to counsel that we draw our attention back
to the White gaze instead of trying to think of ways out of the essential-
ism problem.
Individuality and the denial of the role of groups is part of the
dominant discourse to which Ortiz and Young draw our attention.
This is part of the assimilation model against which Young writes. But,
despite this warning, there is still a strong tendency to locate the prob-
lem of privilege almost entirely in personal relationships. By that view,
addressing privilege becomes an issue of personal relationships. 10 5
The Supreme Court, in its discussion of innocence and affirmative
action, adopts this limited framework; it conceives of both the perpe-
Id. at 805 n.206.
103. Id. at 806.
104. YOUNG, supra note 4, at 171 (citations omitted).
105. The discussion about Whites giving up White privilege often suffers from this limi-
tation. See McIntosh, supra note 3; see alsoJANE LAZARRE, BEYOND THE WHITENESS OF WHITE-
NESS: MEMOIR OF A WHITE MOTHER OF BLACK SONS (1996).
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trator and the subordinated victim as being individual.' 0 6 Young re-
minds us that our personal relationships are mediated through power
and institutional structures; privilege cannot be addressed at only the
personal level. 10 7
Young's criticism of the assimilationist model is insightful and
helps us theorize about the problems of sameness and distribution.
Her critique on Otherness is not as helpful. After acknowledging
some of the limitations of the oppositional stance of Otherness, and
with a nod toward feminist cultural studies warning about valorizing
one's Other, Young does little to help us reframe the process of identi-
fying a positive claim to Otherness in the relational context. Many of
the examples she gives of groups positively claiming their Otherness
are arguably reflective of the oppositional stance against which Young
warns.108
The discussion about the limitations and dangers of simply assert-
ing the positive values of one's Other is taken up by Genevieve Lloyd
in Man of Reason.i0 9 Like Iris Young, Lloyd recognizes the dilemma of
either accepting the universal claims of the dominant group, and the
limitations associated with flatly rejecting the claims. But, unlike
Young, Lloyd focuses her attention on the inutility of valorizing one's
Other.10
Lloyd turns her attention to the role of reason as marking and
justifying the domination of the gendered Other. Lloyd successfully
makes the case that reason, as we understand it, is a male-centered
process that does not occupy the universal mandate that is attributed
to it. This universal consciousness, called "reason," is perceived to be a
prerequisite for membership in public life. Those lacking it, specifi-
cally women and people of color, are justifiably excluded from public
life for their lack of reason under the Enlightenment and modern
model.I" Again, it is their lack and not the White maleness of reason
to which our attention is drawn. Women's immediacy and lack of tran-
106. See Ross, supra note 18. While most of the Court's language on affirmative action
reflects this, the Court has recognized that one of the purposes of affirmative action is
undoing the effects of White Supremacy. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa
Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
107. See YOUNG, supra note 4.
108. In discussing the Black Power Movement and Feminist separatism, Iris Young's
suggestion that these groups might be embracing separatism as a way to gain inclusion in
society is questionable. See id. at 159-62.
109. See e.g., Frye, supra note 40 and MACKINNON, supra note 46.
110. See LLOYD, supra note 5.
111. See id.
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scendence, which is necessary for reasoning, make her a hazard to
public life. 112
Through the work of Simone de Beauvoir, Lloyd highlights the
problems associated with trying to reconstitute the Other without in-
terrogating the dominant discourse. 113 For Lloyd, the challenge is not
one of primarily material re-distribution, but the constitution of the
dominant self and the subordinated Other.'1 4 Lloyd notes that wo-
men participate in the constitution of their own Otherness. 115 Lloyd
acknowledges that many present-day feminists would take issue with
the Sartrean and Hegelian model of the transcendental self and free-
dom that is employed in de Beauvoir's work.' 1 6 Lloyd does not try to
define these models of the self. Instead, the focus is on de Beauvoir's
use of these models. While the philosopher challenges the claim that
women by their bodies are in the Hegelian netherworld and are un-
able to transcend the specific, she nonetheless seems to accept the
model that the immediate, the body, must be transcended." 7 Accord-
ing to Lloyd, de Beauvoir is aware that the body, as experienced by
women, is a social construct, but, nonetheless still seems to be trapped
by the assumptions in the discourse against which she argues.' 18 While
seeming to challenge the Hegelian conceptualization of women as ex-
isting in the netherworld, and in order to understand the social con-
struction of the woman's body, de Beauvoir retains the language of
transcendence without realizing that it contains the anti-female and
the male prospective.
The push by Blacks and other people of color for acceptance as
just individuals, without a confrontation of individuality's construction
in opposition to these groups, has the same limitations. That is, tran-
scendence as oppositional to women is analogous to individualism as
oppositional to Blacks and other racially and culturally subordinated
groups." 19 Lloyd's warning about sameness and assimilation is consti-
tutive and lays the foundation for a constitutive stance on difference
and Otherness.
Can marginalized groups claim the positive nature of their uni-
queness without slipping back into the sameness/otherness dilemma?
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 96-97.
116. See id. at 97-98.
117. See id. at 100-01.
118. See id.
119. See GOLDBERG, supra note 55.
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For women, the issue is whether immediacy can be claimed and the
need for transcendence eschewed. Young believes that this is possible,
through the recognition of difference as relational, rather than oppo-
sitional. But, as Lloyd reminds us, the Otherness of the Other is itself
constituted in the discourse and defined as inferior. 12° Lloyd, like
Young, rejects simply asserting that women should be viewed as having
the same capacity as men to participate in the dominant structures,
including the structure of reason. But Lloyd also argues against simply
accepting as valid what constitutes the Otherness of the Other, even if
one tries to reevaluate it as positive:
However, alternative responses are no less beset by conceptual
complexities. For example, it may seem easy to affirm the value
and strengths of distinctively 'feminine' traits without subscribing
to any covertly assumed 'norm' - to have, as it were, a genuine
version of Rousseau's idea that the female mind is equal, but differ-
ent. But extricating concepts of femininity from the intellectual
structures within which our understanding of sexual difference has
been formed is more difficult than it seems. The idea that women
have their own distinctive kind of intellectual or moral character
has itself been partly formed within the philosophical tradition to
which it may now appear to be a reaction. Unless the structural
features of our concepts of gender are understood, any emphasis
on a supposedly distinctive style of thought or morality is liable to
be caught up in a deeper, older structure of male norms and fe-
male complementation. The affirmation of the value and impor-
tance of 'the feminine' cannot of itself be expected to shake the
underlying normative structures, for, ironically, it will occur in a
space already prepared for it by the intellectual tradition it seeks to
reject.121
Young seems to accept that Otherness is already constituted by
the dominant structure, while Lloyd warns against accepting this.
Lloyd's observation about gender applies with equal weight to other
excluded groups, including racial minorities: "The content of femi-
ninity, as we have it, no less than its subordinate status, has been
formed within an intellectual tradition. What has happened has been
not a simple exclusion of women, but a constitution of femininity
through that exclusion."1 22
This constitution of the Other through subordination and exclu-
sion has also been the process that has constituted the included domi-
nant group.'2 3 The distorting effect of subordination and privilege
120. See LLOYD, supra note 5, at 102-04.
121. Id. at 104-05.
122. Id. at 106.
123. See, e.g., Orni, supra note 61; GOLDBERG, supra note 55; ALLEN, supra note 39.
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marks the "normal" group as well as the denigrated group. 124 This
suggests a need to interrogate not only Otherness, but also the very
structures and institutions that support this apparent normalcy. But,
according to Lloyd, in challenging the norms of the privileged domi-
nant group, it remains important to be agnostic about the norms of
the excluded groups. Indeed, in looking at some of the strengths or
positives associated with excluded groups, Lloyd cautions against turn-
ing these traits into norms: "[S] uch strengths must be seen in relation
to structural features of gender difference. They are strengths that de-
rive from exclusion; and the merits of such 'minority consciousness'
depend on avoiding asserting it as a rival norm." 125
In other words, for Lloyd, asserting that what was negative is now
positive does not resolve the difference dilemma, but may just rein-
scribe the dominant discourse. Lloyd not only argues against simply
trying to claim the positivity of one's Otherness, she also argues
against summarily rejecting the norms of the dominant society. While
being critical of the maleness of reason, she wishes to avoid relativism
or the facile rejection of reason: "The claim that Reason is male need
not at all involve sexual relativism about truth, or any suggestion that
principles of logical thought valid for men do not hold also for female
reasoners."12 6 Lloyd's effort is to adopt an "ambiguous stance" toward
reason; its maleness is not an excuse to leave it uncritically intact:
Philosophers can take seriously feminist dissatisfaction with the
maleness of Reason without repudiating either Reason or Philoso-
phy. Such criticisms of ideals of Reason can in fact be seen as con-
tinuous with a very old strand in the western philosophical
tradition; it has been centrally concerned with bringing to reflec-
tive awareness the deeper structures of inherited ideals of
Reason.127
The complexity of the sameness/otherness dilemma does not
suggest paralysis. As Young point out, there is a pragmatic response to
the immediate problem that would support transformative assimila-
tion as well as groups positively claiming their Otherness.128 Young
124. Toni Morrison makes the observation that we have not focused on the scaring
consequence to Whites of living in a society with slavery and White supremacy. See Mom-
SON, supra note 72. Whites are often willing to concede that slavery and racism have
marked Blacks, but assume they have remained largely untouched.
125. LLOYD, supra note 5, at 106.
126. Id. at 109.
127. Id. Unfortunately, frequently the challenge to Reason and other false claims of
universal norms by groups excluded by these norms is an assertion of the objectivity of
such norms that define the exclusion as justified. See generally, FARBER & SHERRY, supra note
41.
128. See YOUNG, supra note 4.
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makes this assertion despite being aware of the dilemmas of sameness
and Otherness.
As one embraces this dilemma, it becomes apparent that it can-
not be addressed in a solitary, unequivocal manner. It requires en-
gagement with the Other as well as with the norms and institution of
the dominant society. This condition places a high priority on partici-
pation and looks with skepticism on practices, structures, and norms
that exclude marginalized groups. 129 It is not enough for marginal-
ized groups to claim their voice for their community or their world.
They must participate in the making of the world and the selves that
inhabit it.13 0 This moves us toward a communicative ethic where legiti-
macy must be claimed inter-subjectively.13 '
III. The Approach of the Courts: Jurisprudential Devices
Obscure Privilege
Much of the public language that is used to construct the story of
privilege is replete with legal language. The law is more than dis-
course, it is also coercive. But its power goes beyond the force of the
state; it is a powerful medium of rhetoric and myth. It tells a story of
individuality, reason, and symmetry. It is the official organ of the nor-
malcy of White male privilege. It is an ahistoric and acontextualized
story of assimilation that tells a bleaker story of Black failure and defi-
cit, of undeserved in a fair system. This story of Black failure is in no
place more powerful than in the myth of individual Black failure and
individual White innocence.
The Supreme Court has consistently deployed an inter-depen-
dant set of stories and rhetorical techniques to argue that the Consti-
tution provides no solution for these problems. These stories include
that of White innocence, and the related intent requirement. In an
article exploring the use of innocence in Affirmative Action jurispru-
dence, Thomas Ross discusses how the story of the individual "inno-
cent [W]hite victim[ ]" of affirmative action works to avoid "the
argument that white people generally have benefited from the oppres-
sion of people of color, that white people have been advantaged by
this oppression in a myriad of obvious and less obvious ways." 132 Simi-
129. Seejohn a. powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 Ky. L.
J. 9, 93 (1996-97) (citing ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER (1975)).
130. See id.
131. SeeJORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCar-
thy trans., Beacon Press 3rd ed. 1985) (1981).
132. Ross, supra note 18, at 300-01.
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larly, the discriminatory intent standard, premised on an assumption
that people are rational actors whose decisions depend solely on their
individual moral will, treats racism as an individual, aberrational prob-
lem. This approach cannot result in an end to racial subordination,
because it does not address underlying systems of privilege. As Profes-
sor Wildman notes, "The invisible cannot be combated, and as a result
privilege is allowed to perpetuate, regenerate, and re-create itself. ''133
Professor Wildman also writes that "[p] rivilege is invisible only
until looked for, but silence in the face of privilege sustains its invisi-
bility."1 34 Faced with clear evidence of how systems of privilege are
working to reinforce racial disparities, the Court turns a (color) blind
eye. It does this by deploying two seemingly contradictory rhetorical
techniques. First, the Court "decontextualizes" people and groups of
people, portraying them as self-created individuals who live outside of
any social, historical, or political context. As Professor Ross notes, this
decontextualization shores up the story of White innocence. 135 This
approach is epitomized in Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education:' 36
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy.... No one doubts that there
has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the
basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against
innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over-
expansive. 137
Cast into the past and portrayed as too abstract and diffuse to
remedy because "practiced by no one in particular against no one in
particular,"' 38 mere societal discrimination cannot justify disadvantag-
ing innocent Whites. At the same time that it portrays societal discrim-
ination, the Court makes seemingly contradictory "slippery slope"
arguments that, in fact, suggest how deeply and concretely embedded
in society systems of privilege really are. This final rhetorical tech-
nique-the argument, for example, that Blacks cannot be allowed the
right to sit in Whites-only train cars because this would undermine the
justification for segregated schools and anti-miscegenation laws,139 or
that startling evidence of how race influenced capital sentencing
133. Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in
PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 7, 8 (1996).
134. Id.
135. See Ross, supra note 18, at 301.
136. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
137. Id. at 276.
138. Ross, supra note 18, at 304.
139. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-51 (1896).
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could not create a constitutionally-cognizable claim because this
would call into question how racial and other biases work throughout
the criminal justice system 14 0-recognizes the complexity and perva-
siveness of privilege, but uses that as an excuse to turn away, rendering
it invisible again.
A. The Myth of the Innocent White: An Obscuring Device
Since Justice Blackmun's admonition in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke141 that, "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must
first take account of race,"142 the Court has steadily moved away from
this fundamental notion and has proceeded toward the myth of color-
blindness. This doctrinal shift is indicative of the Court's conception
of equality. Equality no longer means that systems of subordination
will not be tolerated; it now means that the systemic manifestations of
racism will be ignored in the name of colorblindness. 143 Cedric Mer-
lin Powell describes how colorblindness functions "as a rhetorical
myth focusing the affirmative action debate not on the victims of sys-
temic racism and caste, but on a generalized class of 'innocents' who
are arbitrarily punished."' 4 4
This choice "reflects a desire to avoid the painful revelations that
may be lurking in an examination of either racial history or the cur-
rent racial disparities in society. 1 45 Thus, proponents of the color-
blind model embrace a series of convenient doctrinal myths,
including the myth of the innocent White.1 46 It is striking that, in or-
der to avoid any consideration of race, it must first be recognized and
140. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 316-17 (1987).
141. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
142. Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. See Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second Decon-
struction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MiM~I L. REV. 191 (1997).
144. Id. at 200.
145. John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric
Against Affirmative Action, 79 IowA L. REV. 313, 324 (1994).
146. Professor Morrison lists the following:
[1] Affirmative action is not colorblind, because it intentionally invokes racial
classifications;
[2] Affirmative action is not based on individuals, but on groups; [3] Affirmative
action is not based on merit;
[4] Affirmative action leads to racial politics and backlash in the form of white
extremists; [5] Affirmative action is exploited by middle-class African-Americans;
[6] Affirmative action stigmatizes its intended "beneficiaries"; [7] Affirmative ac-
tion is social engineering, demanding equal results rather than equal opportu-
nity; and [8] Affirmative action victimizes innocent (white) workers.
Id. at 314.
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then ignored: we are not concerned about race until "innocent
Whites" are injured. As Professor Morrison notes, colorblindness is
held together by a baseless contradiction; it "draws just as much atten-
tion to race as does race consciousness."' 147
In his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell wrote that we "should not
lightly dismiss" the "deep resentment" with which state efforts to rear-
range burdens and benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed
by the "innocent persons" so burdened. 48 This indignation, which
Powell described as evidence that such reapportionment could be
viewed as invidious discrimination, can be attributed to societal, and
judicial, refusal to recognize the operation of White privilege. 1 49 Pow-
ell wrote that innocent individuals "are likely to find little comfort in
the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is merely the
price of membership in the dominant majority and that its imposition
is inspired by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. '150
The Court continued to tell stories about White innocence in the
cases following Bakke. As noted above, in Wygant, the Court held that a
collective bargaining agreement-which had been used in prior litiga-
tion to provide meaningful integration by giving black teachers
greater protections from layoffs than white teachers-was unconstitu-
tional because it violated the constitutional rights of the innocent
White teachers.1 5 1 In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,1 52 Justice Ste-
vens wrote in his concurring opinion that the class of White contrac-
tors "disadvantaged" by a set-aside for minority contractors
"presumably includes ... some who have never discriminated against
anyone on the basis of race."' 53
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Croson spins another strand of the
innocence story, which Thomas Ross describes as the denial of "actual
victim[ization] status" of Blacks. 154 Applying the intent standard dis-
cussed below, Scalia would require proof of a particular act of discrim-
ination against an individual before any kind of affirmative remedy
147. Id. at 338.
148. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978).
149. See Erin E. Byrnes, Note, Unmasking White Privilege to Expose the Fallacy of White Inno-
cence: Using a Theory of Moral Correlativity to Make the Case for Affirmative Action Programs in
Education, 41 ARiz. L. REV. 535 (1999).
150. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 n.34.
151. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270-76 (1986).
152. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
153. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154. Ross, supra note 18, at 306.
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could be justified. 155 By contrast to his denial of the "victimization" of
Blacks absent evidence of an intentionally discriminatory act, he
shows concern for the white victims of affirmative action. "[E]ven 'be-
nign' racial quotas have individual victims, whose very real injustice we
ignore whenever we deny them enforcement of their right not to be
disadvantaged on the basis of race. 1 56
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,1 57 the supposed injury to "in-
nocent Whites" was the denial of a government subcontract to
Adarand, even though it submitted the lowest bid, because it was not a
minority-owned business.158 Justice O'Connor reasoned from a princi-
ple of "consistency," which recognized "that any individual suffers an
injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of
his or her race, whatever that race may be." 159 This concept of consis-
tency required that the Court apply strict scrutiny to determine
whether the injury to "innocent Whites" was justified by a compelling
governmental interest. For Justice O'Connor, racial classifications
could only satisfy this test if used to remedy past illegal
discrimination. 1 60
Even in the rare cases upholding affirmative action policies, the
Court's more moderate Justices adopted language of innocence. In
Fullilove v. Klutznick,16 1 for example, Justice Warren Burger, in uphold-
ing a federal statute mandating a ten percent set-aside for minority
contractors in a federally-supported public works project, wrote that a
"sharing of burdens" by innocent Whites is "not impermissible" as
long as it is "limited and properly tailored . . . to cure the effects of
prior discrimination." 162 Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in United
Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,163 adopted the same
approach: upholding a particular affirmative action program, but em-
phasizing innocence to limit the holding:
[W]e cannot well ignore the social reality that even a benign policy
of assignment by race is viewed as unjust by many in our society,
especially by those individuals who are adversely affected by a given
155. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526-28 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
156. Id. at 527.
157. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
158. See id. at 205.
159. Id. at 229-30.
160. See id. at 235-37.
161. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
162. Id. at 484. Justice Burger also stressed the "relatively light" burden that would be
placed on nonminority contractors by this limited and flexible set-aside. Id
163. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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classification. This impression of injustice may be heightened by
the natural consequence of our governing processes that the most
"discrete and insular" of whites often will be called upon to bear
the immediate, direct costs of benign discrimination. 164
Justice Brennan went on to state: "[However, the] direct nexus to lo-
calities with a history of discriminatory practices or effects enhances
the legitimacy of the Attorney General's remedial authority over indi-
viduals within those communities who benefited (as whites) from
those earlier discriminatory voting patterns."' 65
Justice Brennan limited his plurality opinion in United States v.
Paradise.16 6 In a one-for-one promotion requirement for selection of
state trooper corporals, Justice Brennan noted that the requirement
did not impose an "unacceptable burden on innocent third par-
ties." 16 7 Because of the temporary and extremely limited nature of the
remedy, it did not "disproportionately harm the interests, or unneces-
sarily trammel the rights, of innocent individuals."168
Similarly, Justice Souter in his Adarand dissent agreed with using
"catch-up" mechanisms to eliminate the lingering effects of racial dis-
crimination. 169 He recognized that "members of the historically fa-
vored race" would be harmed as a result of racial classifications, but
that this "is a price to be paid only temporarily." 170 Because he saw
Affirmative Action programs as temporary remedies to eliminate the
effects of past illegal discrimination, "the assumption is that the effects
will themselves recede into the past, becoming attenuated and finally
disappearing."1 71 To comfort those who view Affirmative Action pro-
grams as detrimental to the equal protection rights of non-benefi-
ciaries, Justice Souter reiterated that these programs are only
temporary remedies. 1 72 What is problematic with the approach is not
only that it adopts the myth of the "innocent White," but that in at-
tempting to palliate them, it casts racial subordination and deeply em-
bedded systems of privilege as problems that can be solved soon, and
164. Id. at 174 (Brennan, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 177-78 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
166. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
167. Id. at 182.
168. Id. at 183.
169. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 270 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
170. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. See id. (Souter, J. dissenting). The "temporary nature of this [race-based] remedy
ensures that a race-conscious program will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it
is designed to eliminate." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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thus, the innocent Whites will not have to give up their "rights" for
long.
According to some commentators, the failure of the "innocent
White" to attain a position because of racial classifications is justifiable
because it will effect those persons much differently than it would an
African-American. 173 "Such a failure by a white is unlikely to lead to
his being treated as a second-class citizen" while "[a] similar failure by
a black, however, is likely to perpetuate the stigma of racial stereo-
types and to inhibit the achievement of genuine equal dignity and
respect."'174 Therefore, although affirmative action programs may
treat Whites and African-Americans differently, this does not necessar-
ily mean that it is depriving whites of "legitimate equal opportunity
rights." When viewed in the proper historical perspective, the only
thing of which affirmative action seems to deprive the "innocent
White" is "the increased prospects of success gained as a consequence
of the racially discriminatory acts (or omissions) of the state."' 7 5 This
view has been summed up as follows:
The reduction in the prospects of blacks attributable to official ra-
cial discrimination has already produced a windfall in the form of
increased prospects of success for all the other competitors seeking
to obtain scarce public goods. In this sense, affirmative action
merely restores the equal- opportunity balance, placing both blacks
and whites in the position in which formal.., equality of opportu-
nity would have left them absent official racial discrimination. Con-
sistent with this, affirmative action designed to remedy the present
effects of past discrimination does not take away from "innocent"
whites anything that they have rightfully earned, such as educa-
tional skills developed through hard work, and which they deserve
to keep. Even if completely innocently acquired, the increased
prospects of success gained through the unjust treatment of blacks
are entirely undeserved. Thus, although the loss of these increased
prospects may result in bitter disappointment, it does not amount
to a violation of any equal opportunity right.176
173. See, e.g., Michael L. Manuel, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Is Strict Scrutiny
Fatal in Fact for Governmental Affirmative Action Programs?, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 975 (1997);
Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitu-
tional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1789-90 (1989) (discussing the distinguishing fea-
tures between exclusionary and inclusionary uses of race, and how they pertain to the
Equal Protection Clause).
174. Rosenfeld, supra note 173, at 1789-90. Justice Brennan in his Bakke concurrence
noted that the rejection of Bakke from medical school would not "affect him throughout
his life in the same way as the segregation of the Negro school children in Brown I would
have [been affected]." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 375 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
175. Rosenfeld, supra note 173, at 1790.
176. Id. (footnote omitted).
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"Whites are taught to conceive of racism as putting others at a
disadvantage, yet are encouraged to remain oblivious to the correla-
tion between their own race" and the privilege it accords. 177 "The fail-
ure to acknowledge, the acquiescence in, and the reliance upon, the
hierarchical status quo enables whites to argue against affirmative ac-
tion without appearing inconsistent."178 "[W]hites are taught to think
of their lives as morally neutral [and] normative. ... 179
B. The Intent Standard and Decontextualization as Devices
In McCleskey v. Kemp,180 the Supreme Court was presented with
compelling evidence of how Whites, because of White privilege, re-
ceived more justice in the United States than do non-whites. 181
Rather than address how systems of privilege were implicated in capi-
tal sentencing policies that had a disparate impact on Blacks, the
Court reinforced its requirement that an Equal Protection claim be
supported by proof that individual decision-makers acted with dis-
criminatory intent. Although the Court had established this standard
in Washington v. Davis,1 82 McCleskey v. Kemp "worsened the myopia of
the Court's approach to the reality of racial discrimination by refusing
to acknowledge the . . . effect of race-based statistical disparity in
sentencing."183
Warren McCleskey was an African-American man sentenced to
death in Georgia for the murder of a White police officer.18 4 In his
habeas petition, he presented a statistical study-the Baldus study-in
support of his claim that Georgia's capital sentencing policy was being
administered in a racially discriminatory manner. 18 5 The study
showed that murder defendants in Georgia with White victims were
more than four times as likely to receive the death penalty as defend-
ants with Black victims.1 86 Furthermore, the death penalty was as-
sessed in 22% of cases involving Black defendants and White victims,
8% of cases involving White defendants and White victims, 3% of
177. Byrnes, supra note 149, at 558.
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, 1990
INDEP. SCH. 31, 31-33 (1990)).
180. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
181. See id. at 286.
182. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
183. Tanya Kateri Hernhndez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of
Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REv. 97, 142 n.229 (1998).
184. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279, 283.
185. See id. at 286.
186. See id.
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cases involving White defendants and Black victims, and only 1% of
cases involving Black defendants and Black victims.18 7 The Court con-
cluded that, even if it were to take this evidence as true, the defendant
had failed to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination by the
individual decision-makers that had had a discriminatory effect on
him. 188
"Decontextualization" is one of the rhetorical devices that courts
commonly use to justify the exclusion and subordination of different
groups of people.18 9 The intent standard incorporates this technique
by portraying individuals as living outside of any social, historical, or
political context. Implicit in this approach is another rhetorical de-
vice: the use of arguments and language that draw on dominant
norms to convey the impression of objective and neutral decision-
making.1 0 At the heart of the intent standard is the deeply embedded
assumption about the nature of identity, namely, that all of us, includ-
ing the participants in Georgia's capital sentencing process, are ra-
tional individuals whose decisions depend solely on individual moral
will. 191
In trying to meet the heavy burden of proof imposed by the
Court's intent standard, Warren McCleskey presented historical evi-
dence to demonstrate discriminatory intent on the part of Georgia's
legislature. Although the Court acknowledged that the historical back-
ground of a legislative decision is one evidentiary source of proof of
intentional discrimination, it held that, unless this evidence is "reason-
ably contemporaneous with the challenged decision, it has little pro-
bative value."'1 2 Furthermore, even if Georgia's legislature was aware
of the racially disparate impact of its sentencing policies, proof of de-
cision-makers' awareness of the consequences of allowing the policy to
remain in force was not enough. McCleskey would have to prove that
the legislature selected the policy because of, not despite of, its ad-
verse effects upon Blacks.1 93
187. See id.
188. See id. at 292-93 (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967) and Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
189. See LESLIE BENDER & DAAN BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note 3, at
138-41.
190. See Wildman & Davis, supra note 133, at 8.
191. "My schooling gave me no training in seeing myself as an oppressor, as an unfairly
advantaged person, or as a participant in a damaged culture. I was taught to see myself as
an individual whose moral state depended on her individual moral will." McIntosh, supra
note 3, at 24.
192. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 n.20.
193. See id. at 298.
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This decontextualization (or dehistoricization), ignored the fact
that:
[It had] been scarcely a generation since [the] Court's first deci-
sion striking down racial segregation, and barely two decades since
the legislative prohibition of racial discrimination in major do-
mains of national life. These have been honorable steps, but we
cannot pretend that in three decades we have completely escaped
the grip of a historical legacy spanning centuries.194
Ironically, the Court accused the Baldus study of "ignoring the
realities" of criminal sentencing, and, in particular, the discretion in-
herent in the process.19 5 It criticized the study for taking cases with
different results "on what are contended to be duplicate facts" and
concluding that differences in the results were based on race alone,196
whereas, according to the Court, these differences could be explained
by the individual characteristics of the individual defendants and the
facts of the particular capital offense. The Court maintained its con-
clusion despite the fact that the study took into account non-racial
factors that might have legitimately influenced sentencing. 197 By fo-
cusing on the individual-the individual defendant, case, and deci-
sion-maker-the Court rendered the evidence of privilege exposed by
the study invisible again. Thereby, the Court was able to make the
perverse assertion that any inference of discriminatory intent raised by
the study could be rebutted by a legitimate, non-discriminatory rea-
son: the fact that McCleskey committed an act for which the United
States Constitution and Georgia law permit imposition of the death
penalty.
As Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent, discretion is not a
reason to ignore the statistics; it is rather one of the factors shaping
them. The Baldus study found that prosecutors were nearly four times
as likely to seek the death penalty in a case involving a Black defend-
ant and a White victim, than in a case with a White defendant and a
Black victim. 198 Considering Georgia's long history of dual punish-
194. Id. at 344 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
195. See id. at 290.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 287. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, the Court's Title VII juris-
prudence did not require multiple regression analysis to account for every conceivable
variable, as long as it accounted for the major factors that are likely to influence decisions.
See id. at 327-28 (Brennan,J., dissenting). In fact, in response to criticisms and suggestions
by the district court, Professor Baldus conducted additional regression analysis, "all of
which confirmed, and some of which even strengthened, the study's original conclusions."
Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 287. The study found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70%
of cases involving Black defendants and White victims, but in only 32% of cases involving
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ment and the continuing influence of race in its sentencing system,1 99
it is not surprising that prosecutors made the decision to seek the
death penalty in these cases; they knew they were likely to succeed.
Georgia had no guidelines governing prosecutorial decisions to seek
the death penalty, and provided jurors with no list of aggravating and
mitigating factors to consider. Individual discretion, Justice Brennan
notes, created significant "opportunit[ies] for racial considerations,
however subtle and unconscious, to influence charging and sentenc-
ing decisions." 20 0
C. The Device of the Slippery Slope
Another rhetorical technique that the Court often uses to deny
relief to those challenging their subordination under systems of White
privilege is the "slippery slope." As noted above, much of the Court's
rhetoric works to make privilege invisible. Ironically, the argument
that the Constitution cannot be used to combat a specific iteration of
subordination because doing would call into question assumptions
that run throughout the legal system, suggests how deeply and con-
cretely embedded in society systems of White privilege really are. 20 1
In McCleskey the Court reasoned that recognizing the defendant's
claim would open a Pandora's box:
[I]f we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissi-
bly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced
with similar claims as to other types of penalty ... the claim that his
sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be ex-
tended to apply to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that
correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even to
gender.20 2
This is not a new technique. The Court has been drumming in
the parade of horribles to undermine challenges to White privilege
for nearly a century. Holding in Plessy v. Ferguson20 3 that the object of
White defendants and White victims; 15% of cases involving Black defendants and Black
victims; and 19% of cases involving White defendants and Black victims. See id. Further-
more, cases involving Black defendants and White victims were more likely to result in a
death sentence than any other racial combination of defendant and victim. See id. at 321
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 328-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the 15 years preceding the McCleskey
decision, the Court invalidated portions of Georgia's capital sentencing system on three
separate occasions. See id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. Bender and Braveman note that the rhetoric of the slippery slope is commonly
used tojustify exclusion and subordination. See BENDER & BRAVEmAN, supra note 189 at 140.
202. McKleskey, 481 U.S. at 315-17.
203. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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the Fourteenth Amendment was to ensure the equality of the races
before the law, but not "to abolish distinctions based upon color," the
Court hinted at the problems that would follow if Plessy were allowed
to sit in a Whites-only train coach. 20 4 Noting that laws requiring the
separation of Whites and non-Whites were "generally, if not univer-
sally" 2°15 accepted as valid, the Court went on to list areas where such
distinctions had been upheld: namely the establishment of separate
schools for White and non-White children and anti-miscegenation
laws. 20 6 These laws, which were enacted in "good faith for the promo-
tion of the public good," and not for the oppression of a particular
class, were therefore valid.20 7 When, in Brown v. Board of Education,20 8
the Court finally overruled Plessy, the same recognition of how deeply
entrenched were systems of White privilege in society shaped and lim-
ited the relief granted. Separate but equal was no longer equal, but
the Court, acknowledging how widely the impact of its decision would
be felt, and the fact that desegregation would involve "problems of
considerable complexity," ordered an equitable approach.20 9 There-
fore, in eliminating a variety of obstacles to bring school systems into
accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in Brown I, only
a "prompt and reasonable" start toward full compliance with that
opinion was required.2 10
Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that addi-
tional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective man-
ner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such
time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good
faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the
courts may consider problems related to administration, arising
from the physical condition of the school plant, the school trans-
portation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attend-
ance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining
admission to the public schools on a non-racial basis, and revision
of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the
foregoing problems. 211
This repeating narrative, the recognition of the indices of the
privilege and then a subsequent backing away from its full implica-
tions, also intertwines with the Court's rhetoric of intent and the sto-
204. Id. at 544.
205. Id. at 544-45.
206. See id. at 544.
207. Id. at 550.
208. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I].
209. Id. at 495.
210. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
211. Id. at 300-01.
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ries it tells about innocence. In Washington v. Davis,21 2 the Court
justifies its holding that a facially-neutral policy cannot be held invalid
merely because it benefits or burdens one race more than another,
because the impact of holding otherwise "would be far reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes
that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black
than to the more affluent white. '2 13
D. Positive Steps Taken by the Court
There are counterstories in the language of the Court, language
that hints at the dilemma of sameness and Other. Some of the clearest
language occurs when the Court acknowledges and discusses the dis-
establishment of White supremacy or when the Court rejects the acon-
textual claim of individuals removed from the context of the group.
The Court has not entirely shied away from exposing the ways in
which systems of privilege create racial disparities. As Martha Minow
notes, "[s]ometimes, judges have challenged the assumption that the
status quo is natural and good; they have occasionally approved public
and private decisions to take difference into account in efforts to alter
existing conditions and to remedy their harmful effects. '2 14
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education,21 5 for exam-
ple, ChiefJustice Burger, delivering the opinion of the Court, recog-
nized the complex interaction between continuing racial imbalances
in schools and changing residential patterns. He noted how school
decisions, in response to changes in housing patterns, can further
"promote segregated residential patterns which, when combined with
'neighborhood zoning,' further lock the school system into the mold
of separation of the races." 2 16
212. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
213. Id. at 248. According to one study cited by the Court, "disproportionate-impact
analysis might invalidate 'tests and qualifications for voting, draft deferment, public em-
ployment, jury service, and other government-conferred benefits and opportunities ... ;
[s]ales taxes, bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, license fees, and other state-imposed
charges."' Id. at 248, n.14 (citations omitted). In addition, "minimum wage and usury laws
as well as professional licensing requirements would require major modifications in light of
the unequal-impact rule." Id. (citations omitted).
214. Minow, supra note 28, at 106.
215. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
216. Id. at 21.
The construction of new schools and the closing of old ones are two of the most
important functions of local school authorities and also two of the most complex.
They must decide questions of location and capacity in light of population
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This more complex understanding of how different types of ra-
cial disparity interact allowed the Court to imagine broad remedies,
rather than attempt to put these problems, once recognized, some-
place where courts could not reach them.217 Chief Justice Burger ac-
knowledged the massiveness of the problem of desegregation, which
had been rendered more difficult by changes in the "structure and
patterns of communities, the growth of student population, move-
ment of families, and other changes, some of which had [a] marked
impact on school planning 2.... 18 Nevertheless, he reiterated that
the objective remained to eliminate from public schools all vestiges of
state-imposed segregation, and thus, a court, in remedying past
wrongs, could take steps that "may be administratively awkward, incon-
venient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens
on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided
in the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to
eliminate the dual school systems."21 9
The Court cautioned that "[in seeking to define even in broad
and general terms how far this remedial power extends it is important
to remember that judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis
growth, finances, land values, site availability, through an almost endless list of
factors to be considered. The result of this will be a decision which, when com-
bined with one technique or another of student assignment, will determine the
racial composition of the student body in each school in the system. Over the
long run, the consequences of the choices will be far reaching. People gravitate
toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of
people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential
development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition
of inner-city neighborhoods.
Id. at 20-21.
217. Cf Freeman v. Pitts, where justice Kennedy approved the district court's decision to
relinquish supervision and control over student assignments because the racial imbalance
in the "schools was not a vestige of the prior dejure dual education system[,]" but rather
the inevitable result of individual housing choices. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 478
(1992).
218. Swann, 402 U.S. at 14.
219. Id. at 28. Compare Justice Kennedy's invocation of the slippery slope in Freeman v.
Pitts.
It is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to
try to counteract these kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts. To
attempt such results would require ongoing and never-ending supervision by the
courts of school districts simply because they were once de jure segregated. Resi-
dential housing choices, and their attendant effects on the racial composition of
schools, present an ever-changing pattern, one difficult to address through judi-
cial remedies.
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495.
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of a constitutional violation."220 But, despite this limitation, the recog-
nition that residential and other seemingly neutral societal patterns
react to the remnants of past school segregation and enable ongoing
violations allows the Court to approve a remedy-the use of racial bal-
ance goals-which challenges these patterns by taking difference into
account.
Similarly, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,22 1 the Court, in up-
holding a federal program that used minority ownership as a "plus
factor" in proceedings for new broadcasting licenses, considered both
racial imbalances and their deeper impact. As Justice Brennan noted,
not only were there significant statistical disparities between non-mi-
nority and minority ownership, but "as late entrants who often have
been able to obtain only the less valuable stations, many minority
broadcasters serve geographically limited markets with relatively small
audiences." 222 Despite the lack of a bad actor with discriminatory in-
tent, the Court recognized that a race-conscious policy was necessary
to counter these structural barriers to the important goal of increasing
diversity on the airwaves. 223
But perhaps the best work that is done by the Court is when it
acknowledges and discusses the disestablishment of White supremacy,
as I mentioned above. The cases I will touch on next contain language
that suggests a cognizance of the need to transform structures in or-
der to disturb White supremacy and alter existing power structures.
One example of this positive language is found in Justice Bren-
nan's opinion in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'International Ass'n v.
EEOC224 There, Justice Brennan acknowledged the systemic nature of
privilege, and the need for a remedial device that is far-reaching, not
merely operative at the level of the individual: "The purpose of affirm-
ative action is not to make identified victims whole, but rather to dis-
mantle prior patterns of employment discrimination and to prevent
discrimination in the future. Such relief is provided to the class as a
whole rather than to individual members." 225
Some understanding of the systemic history and contemporary
function of privilege is conveyed in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, California226 as well. There, the Court opined that:
220. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
221. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
222. Id. at 553-54.
223. See id. at 600.
224. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
225. Id. at 474.
226. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
[Vol. 34
RACIAL PRIVILEGE
Public and private employers might choose to implement affirma-
tive action for many reasons other than to purge their own past sins
of discrimination. The Jackson school board, for example, said it
had done so in part to improve the quality of education in Jack-
son-whether by improving black students' performance or by dis-
pelling for black and white students alike any idea that white
supremacy governs our social institutions. Other employers might
advance different forward-looking reasons for affirmative action:
improving their services to black constituencies, averting racial ten-
sion over the allocation of jobs in a community, or increasing the
diversity of a work force, to name but a few examples. Or they
might adopt affirmative action simply to eliminate from their oper-
ations all de facto embodiment of a system of racial caste. All of
these reasons aspire to a racially integrated future, but none
reduces to "racial balancing for its own sake." 227
Hopeful language is located, as well, in other cases where White
supremacy is not just hinted as being the source of problems similar to
those that have been discussed in this Article, but White supremacy is
named as the source. In Adarand, Justices Ginsburg's dissenting opin-
ion cites Loving v. Virginia,2 28 a case in which that state's ban on inter-
racial marriages was held to be unconstitutional, as indicative of the
fact that "the Constitution and this Court would abide no measure
'designed to maintain White Supremacy."' 229
The Court went further in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co.,2 30 by
not only acknowledging White supremacy, but by bringing to the sur-
face both its pervasiveness and its effect of severely limiting Blacks'
world-making abilities:
Objectives of Negro citizens of Port Gibson and Claiborne County
are, simply put, to have equality of opportunity, in every aspect of
life, and to end the white supremacy which has pervaded commu-
nity life. This implies many long-range objectives such as participa-
tion in decision-making at every level of community, civic, business
and political affairs. 231
These examples reflect the most positive effort on the part of the
Court to incorporate an understanding of White privilege into its
opinions.
227. Id. at 647 (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme
Court-Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV.
78, 96 (1986)).
228. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
229. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J. dis-
senting) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
230. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
231. Id. at 899-900 n.26.
Spring 20001
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Conclusion
This critical examination of privilege has revealed that the same
stories to which scholars and theorists cite as being powerfully rein-
forcing of existing power structures are the stories that the courts are
listening to and repeating. Recent jurisprudence has been the site of a
shift further away from recognizing privileging structures. Instead, the
court has nearly narrowed its view to see only individual harms perpe-
trated by one individual onto another.
It is clear that the Court has not gone far enough in addressing
privilege, but even theorists are unclear about the type of remedy that
could be sought by the Court. A deep interrogation of privilege is re-
quired in order to assist a positive, jurisprudential shift.
This Article has tried to show that, as important as the acknowl-
edgement of privilege is, it is not enough. The dilemma of sameness
and difference can only be addressed by interrogating the dominant
discourse of the White gaze while challenging the material conditions
that support it. This is neither a simple rejection nor embrace of
Whiteness or of Otherness, but a transformation that disturbs both.
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